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Abstract
I develop a simple dynamic model of reputation-based transactions between
a buyer in one country and a supplier in another. I use the model to study the
impact of a more stringent regulation on the buyer optimal purchase volume
within an existing buyer-seller partnership. A more stringent standard a¤ects
the volume of trade in two intuitive ways: directly, a stricter standard a¤ects
the supply of quality goods and indirectly through reputation. I refer to the
former e¤ect as the regulation e¤ect, and to the latter as the reputation e¤ect.
I show that, whereas most of the empirical literature has so far assumed that
more stringent standards would be likely to reduce trade, the net e¤ect is in
fact non-monotone, even without taking into account endogenous technological
upgrading in the supplier country. It varies with the belief the buyer holds
about his seller at the time the change in regulation takes place. For both very
low and very high sellers reputation, the reputation e¤ect is negligible vis-à-
vis the regulation e¤ect. For intermediate levels of the suppliers reputation,
reputation has the power to signicantly mitigate the direct negative e¤ect
of a more stringent sanitary standard on trade. This result has signicant
implications for developing countries, for which access to developed countries
markets is by and large, said to be disproportionately constrained by stricter
standards.
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1 Introduction
Food safety issues are increasingly important in the arena of international food trade.
As countries lower their tari¤s and become more integrated into world markets, there
is a presumption that food safety measures can be used as a protectionist tool (Beghin
2001). As consumers grow wealthier, they also focus more on the attributes of their
food, its safety and nutrition.
So far, the empirical literature has assumed that enhanced stringency of food
regulations have, by and large, a negative e¤ect on developing-country exports. Is
this necessarily true? The answer is no for at least three reasons. First, standards
can facilitate trade by ensuring a controlled quality for processors. Second, standards
may come with technical assistance that helps upgrade quality and enables exporters
to target more markets. Third, even without endogenous quality upgrading, when
consumers cannot evaluate the quality of a good before purchasesuch goods are re-
ferred to as experience or credence goods in the literature1more stringent standards
may improve the information available to purchasers on product safety, increasing
their condence. This may in turn a¤ect their optimal purchase volumes which go
counter to the rst-approach intuition. The impact of a food regulation on trade
thus stems from the direct cost of compliance incurred by suppliers, and indirect
supply and demand e¤ects.
What I set up to do in this paper, is design a simple model that highlights the poten-
tial non monotonicity in the relationship between regulation stringency and purchase
volumes. I develop a simple dynamic model of reputation-based transactions between
a buyer in one country and a supplier in another. I study a situation where quality
is imperfectly observable.
What do we know about the impact of food standards on trade?2 Empirical evi-
dence shows that the proliferation and enhanced stringency of food safety standards
do impede exports of developing countries, either because explicit bans are placed on
imports or because the costs of compliance diminish their export competitiveness.
Maskus et al (2005) show that complying with regulations entails non-trivial xed
costs and raises signicantly short-run production costs. Also the lack of institu-
tional capacity limit developing countries ability to cope with stringent standards
(Kim and Reinert 2009). A large set of studies has focused on the quantitative as-
1An experience or a credence good is distinguished by the fact that its quality cannot be deter-
mined by consumers at the time of purchase. The true quality of an experience good is revealed
later when consumers experience its consumption. The true quality of a credence good is never
fully revealed to consumers.(Nelson, 1970; Darby and Karni 1973)
2Throughout the paper, the terms regulation and standards are used interchangeably.
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sessment of the impact of food regulations on trade. Using gravity-based analysis
they provide evidence of the detrimental e¤ect of domestic regulations on developing
countries agricultural and food exports (Otsuki et al., 2001; Fontagné et al.,2005;
Fulponi, 2006). Crucially, the impact of importing country standards varies with
the level of income of the exporting country, with negative e¤ects being more likely
vis-à-vis developing country exporters (Disdier et al., 2008). An alternative and less
pessimistic view, largely based on detailed case studies, emphasizes the potential
catalyzing role product standards may play in the promotion of quality upgrading
and technical progress in developing countries (Diaz Rios and Ja¤ee 2008; Henson
and Ja¤ee 2008).
From a theory perspective, there is substantial evidence that the impact of reg-
ulation is more complicated than much of the empirical literature suggests. In the
words of Swann (2010) "Existing econometric models represent, at best, black boxes
that disguise a complex of relationships." A large body of literature, derived from
research in industrial economics, has made it possible to account for supply and
demand-side sophisticated e¤ects. Regulations may confer competitive advantage to
complying rms, due to improved control and increased e¢ ciencyi.e. direct positive
externalities generated by the (quality) management systems adopted (Henson and
Caswell, 1999). Regulations may also generate a competitive advantage if they have
a positive e¤ect on demand. Due to the credence aspect of the "safety" attribute,
regulations can modify the information available to consumers (Shapiro, 1983; Don-
nenfeld et al., 1985). Regulations by improving the information on which to base
decisions avoid or reduces the costs of assessing product qualitythe lemon problem
(Leland,1979; Marette,1998; Bureau and Marette, 2001).
Also, there is an extensive theoretical literature on the importance of producers
reputations as quality indicators. In environments with informational asymmetries
and repeated purchases, Shapiro (1983) demonstrates how building up a reputation
can improve the market outcome. Price premiums paid by consumers are necessary
for producers to invest in quality and reputation, provided that these e¤orts are ex-
plicitly or implicitly communicated to consumers. Minimum quality standards also
have a function in reducing reputation establishment costs (Falvey, 1989). Regula-
tions may also modify the costs of signaling quality and possibly result in improved
competitiveness of those that meet stringent standards (Jones and Hudson, 1996;
and Hudson and Jones, 2001, 2003).
The issues of reputation has also received some attention in the trade literature.
The volume of trade increases with the belief the buyer holds about suppliersability
to successfully ll large orders (Rauch and Watson, 2003). Closer to this paper, is
the work of Araujo and Ornelas (2007). They develop a model where agents build
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a reputation to overcome the di¢ culties created by the imperfect enforcement of
international contracts. Unlike my paper, they consider an asymmetric information
setting. Their results suggest that reputation serves only imperfectly to mitigate the
negative e¤ect of weak contract enforcement.
On the whole, the available evidence on the variety of channels through which
regulation may impact trade, leaves little doubt that the net e¤ect of a more stringent
regulation on trade is not straightforward. However, this relationship has to my
knowledge not been studied before. This paper seeks to ll this gap and provides
a small, simple model that describes the interplay between regulation stringency,
reputations and purchase volumes.
There is one buyer and sellers in two di¤erent countries. There are two types of sellers,
good and bad quality sellers. This is standard in reputation models (Tirole 1996;
Kreps and Wilson, 1982), where sellers are of di¤erent types and are exogenously
di¤erent. The supply at various qualities is exogenous as in Leland (1979). The
buyer wants to import goods from good quality sellers. He forms a partnership with
a supplier in another country. The sellers type is unknown to the buyer and the
seller and is revealed over time to both through experimentation. The common belief
that the seller is good is termed the sellers reputation. I study situations where the
acquisition of information is symmetric, unlike earlier papers, where sellers most
often are aware of their product quality (Shapiro, 1983). When the buyer forms
a partnership, he proposes a one-period contract to the seller and incurs a search
cost. Because the buyer cannot contract on the quality of the good, his decision
to import and how much to import depends only on the belief he holds about the
sellers type. A pessimistic buyer may start small to uncover the nature of his
supplier (Ray, 1996, Watson, 1999, 2002). This result arises endogenously from the
model. The buyers belief, in turn depends on the export history of the seller. Sellers
behave mechanistically. Sellers choosing their quality and behaving strategically,
would result in a moral hazard problem (Grossman and Shapiro, 1988; Falvey, 1989).
The buyers country sets a minimum quality standard against which every shipment
of goods is tested for compliance before purchase3. The minimum quality standard is
set exogenously. Realisation is publicly observable but true quality is not. The buyer
and seller update their belief accordingly through Bayesian revision. Updated beliefs
a¤ect future decisions, because the buyer decides on its import volume according to
his updated belief. Lastly, the buyer in a partnership with a seller learns about his
type over time. The match persists until the buyer decides to break the partnership
and switch to another seller for which he starts with an initial belief. In my setting,
3The buyer does not choose to detect quality or not as in Marette et al., (2001)
4
the buyer may form a partnership with only one seller at a time. This drastic
simplifying assumption allows me to take down the problem to its simplest expression
since bandit models are inherently complex (see Rothschild, 1994; Whittle, 1982;
Bar-Isaac, 2001).
I use the model to study the impact of a more stringent regulation on the buyer
optimal purchase volume within an existing buyer-seller partnership. A more strin-
gent standard a¤ects the volume of trade in two intuitive ways. First, there is a direct
supply-side e¤ect. A stricter regulation induces a higher rate of rejection for ship-
ments following inspection. The e¤ect decreases with the sellers reputation. Second,
there is an indirect demand-side e¤ect. A stricter regulation facilitates the formation
of reputations. The buyer imports more as he becomes more optimistic about his
seller. Hence, a more stringent regulation has an indirect positive e¤ect on future
trade volumes. This in turn moderates the direct negative e¤ect of the regulation
on trade. I refer to the former e¤ect as the regulation e¤ect, and to the latter as the
reputation e¤ect. Overall, I show that the net e¤ect of a stricter regulation on trade
volume varies non monotonically with the belief the buyer holds about his seller at
the time the change in regulation takes place. This is so even without taking into
account endogenous technological upgrading in the supplier country. For both very
low and very high sellers reputation, the reputation e¤ect is negligible vis-à-vis the
regulation e¤ect. For intermediate levels of the suppliers reputation, the reputation
e¤ect may signicantly water down the direct negative e¤ect.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Sec-
tion 3 describes the dynamics of a partnership. Section 4 formalises the relationship
between reputation and trade. And Section 5 studies the implications of a change in
regulation on trade ows. Finally, Section 6 concludes. The appendix contains all
formal proofs.
2 The basic Framework
Consider one buyer and an innite pool of sellers in two countries. The horizon is
innite, with discounting factor  2 [0; 1].4 The seller can be a good-quality seller or
a bad-quality one. Let j = G;B be the sellers type.5 In each discrete time period,
4Note that for  2 (0; 1) all qualitative results derived below hold, though the discount factor
would a¤ect the level of the critical reputation discussed in proposition (1). However for  2 f0; 1g,
results need not hold. If  = 0, the game is a one shot game and dynamic reputational concerns
are irrelevant, and if  = 1, there are potentially innite future rewards.
5The distribution of types in the pool of sellers is unknown to the both buyer and sellers.
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each seller can produce a single, homogenous good under a constant-marginal cost
technology with random quality  2 [0; 1] drawn from one of two possible uniform
distributions G(G; 
G
); B(B; 
B
); such that:
j() =
(
1

j j for 
j <  < 
j
0 otherwise
; j = G;B:
where 0 < B < G < 
B
< 
G
< 1; and 
B   B = G   G: The seller type is
unknown to buyer and seller and is revealed over time to both through experimen-
tation.
At the beginning of the game, the buyers government sets a minimum quality
standard m. The buyer implements sanitary control procedures and at the beginning
of each period t; he decides to import from a seller. Before purchase, each shipment
is tested for compliance with the buyers standard. If a shipment fails the test, it is
rejected. The event of a test failure by the incumbent supplier is marked by a binary
variable
t =

1 if the test is failed at t
0 otherwise.
The realisation is publicly observable. However quality  is unobservable to both
seller and buyer. The test does not reveal the true quality of the good ; instead it
reveals whether  is below or above the quality standard.
In each period, a type-j seller has a probability of failure:
Pr(t = 1j j) = j(m)
and,
j(m) =
8>><>>:
0 for m < 
j
m G

G G for 
j < m < 
j
1 for 
j
< m
; j = G;B
where 0 < G< B< 1. G and B are common knowledge. The probability of
failure is independent and identical across time and depends only on the type of the
seller and the level of the minimum quality standard. In fact, the two types of sellers
di¤er only in that each time a good seller produces a good it will meet the buyers
quality standard with a higher probability 1 G: In order to avoid zones of complete
revelation j 2 f0; 1g; j = G;B, I restrict m 2 [G; 
B
]: On the common support
[G; 
B
]; G() = B() > 0: Since @j=@m = 
j(); two important implications
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follow, (i) a more stringent standard raises the probability of failure, and (ii) a change
in the regulation a¤ects both types equally.
The buyer is risk neutral and seeks to maximize the discounted present value of
prots. At the beginning of period t, the buyer o¤ers a one-period contract6 to the
seller he is in partnership with. Buyer and seller share a common belief that with
probability t the seller is goodthis belief is termed the sellers reputation.
The contract species a quantity q, together with a clause stating that payment will
be made only upon successful inspection. The shipment is tested for compliance. If it
passes inspection (event t = 0), the buyer pays a constant unit price p and receives
u(:) characterised by diminishing marginal returns on q.7 If it fails it is rejected and
the buyer receives nothing. Also, in both cases, he pays a per unit inspection cost c;
and writing the contract involves a xed cost f > 0 that is incurred no matter what.8
The existence of the xed cost paid in each period, induces the buyer to trade with
one seller at a time. The buyers per-period prot is:
(p; q; c; f) =

u(p; q)  cq   f if t = 0
 cq   f otherwise. (1)
with uq > 0 and uqq < 0: The quantity q is independent of the outcome of the
inspection in the same period though it varies with the history of the sellers previous
successes and failures.
Supposing that each seller begins with some initial reputation 09, the game can
be summarized as the repetition of the following steps:
1. At the beginning of period t, the buyer decides to import from a seller with
reputation t.
2. The buyer o¤ers a one-period contract to the seller specifying a quantity q.
6Such short-term contract conforms well to actual agri-food business pratices. The class of the
contract the buyer o¤ers to suppliers does not allow the buyer to extract any information on the
type of the supplier.
7In this setup I restrict the price of the good p, to be constant. Instead it is quantity that plays
an important role and depends on the sellers reputation.
8I assume that the buyer pays c to inspect every shipment whether the shipment passed or failed
inspection. In practice, the buyer may be reimbursed by the seller for lots that fail inspection, or
the cost may be shared with the seller.
9The buyer has no information on the distribution of types among its potential sellers. He
assigns the same initial prior 0 to any seller he initiates a partnership with.
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3. The seller produces q units of homogeneous good of quality  drawn from either
G; B, depending on the sellers type.
4. The shipment is tested for compliance with the buyers standard m. A type-j
supplier passes inspection with probability 1   j; and fails with probability
j: The seller is deemed good with probability t and bad with probability
1  t: Then, the buyer per-period expected prot is:
E(jt) = [t(1 G) + (1  t)(1 B)]u(p; q)  cq   f (2)
5. The realisation of t as a success or a failure is publicly observed. On the basis
of the realisation the buyer revises his belief with respect to the sellers type,
so that the sellers end of period reputation is t+1:
He then decides at the beginning of period t+ 1 whether to keep dealing with
the incumbent seller or switch to a new one. If he switches from an incumbent
to a new seller, he initiates a new partnership and incurs a one time xed
switching cost, s, that captures in a simple way the buyers cost to engage in
business. If the current partnership ends the seller looses his ability to sell to
the buyer and is replaced by a new active seller.
Throughout I suppose that the information structure is common knowledge. The
seller has no private information. Instead, the buyer and potential seller share the
same beliefs and update these beliefs identically. Quality is not observable, only
inspection realisations convey information about the sellers type. The buyer strategy
is simply to decide whether or not to stick to the incumbent seller given the realisation
of t, and how much to purchase at t + 1 from either the incumbent, if he kept
him, or an alternative seller, if he switched. Sellers have no strategy, they behave
mechanistically. This framework ignores any forms of signalling and allows me to
focus on the role of sellers reputation on (i) the decision of the buyer to trade (Section
3) and (ii) the volume of trade (Section 4 and Section 5). The buyer necessarily
terminates the partnership when  = 0: Stated di¤erently, let q?() be the buyers
optimal purchase volume given belief . Then q?(0) = 0 and q?(1) > 0; that is, a
buyer would always buy from a good type and never buy from a bad type if he knew.
3 Buyer policy
In this section I consider the buyers optimal policy as concerns whether or not to
stick to the incumbent seller given the realisation in the previous period. In deciding
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whether or not to switch sellers, the buyer takes into account both the prot he
expects to earn in that period and the value of information generated about the
sellers type in a further trading experience. At the beginning of each period t, the
incumbent sellers failure history is
ht 1 = f0 ; 0+1; :::; t 1g
where  0 is the rst period in which the buyer bought from him. Given ht 1 and t,
i.e. at the end of period t, the common belief that the seller is good is
t(ht 1; t) = Pr( j = Gjht):
Following a success or failure, the sellers reputation is updated according to Bayes
rule:
ln
t
1  t = ln
t 1
1  t 1 +
(
ln 
G
B
if t = 0
ln 1 
G
1 B otherwise.
(3)
The posterior belief follows a two element distribution, such that the reputation after
a success or a failure in period t, are given respectively by st and 
f
t.
Symmetric information implies that the buyers value of trading only depends on the
current reputation of the seller he is in partnership with. Since the buyer may decide
to switch to a new seller in any period, at the beginning of each period t the optimal
policy given reputation t 1 is to stick to the incumbent whenever
V (t 1)  V (0)  s
where
V (t 1) = E(jt 1) + maxfE(V (t));V (0)  sg (4)
is the buyers expected value of trading with the current incumbent given a repu-
tation t 1: And V (0)   s is the expected value of switching to a new seller and
incurring a switching cost s, with V (0)  s  0 otherwise the buyer would not ini-
tiate a partnership. In expression (4) E(jt 1) is the prot in the current period.
Future expected prots, whether the buyer stayed with the incumbent or switched,
maxfE(V (t));V (0)   sg, are discounted at the discount rate . Expanding ex-
pression (4) using equation (2) gives:
V (t 1)= ((1 G)t 1 + (1 B)(1  t 1))u(p; q)  cq   f
+maxfV (st);V (0)  sg[(1 G)t 1 + (1 B)(1  t 1)]
+maxfV (ft );V (0)  sg[
G
t 1+B(1  t 1)]
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where (1 G)t 1+(1 B)(1 t 1) is the probability the seller will prove successful
in period t; and Gt 1+B(1 t 1) that he will fail. In the former case expected
prots, whether the buyer kept his incumbent or switched aremaxfV (st);V (0) sg,
in the latter expected prots aremaxfV (ft );V (0) sg: If at the beginning of period
t, there is a very low belief that the seller is good, t 1, the buyer may buy at a loss in
the current period and would not expect much valuable information to be generated
by further trial with the same seller10. Equivalently, at a su¢ ciently low reputation,
both the current expected gains and the option to continue selling will be so low as
not to compensate the seller for the cost of trading and he will switch. This intuition
is formalized in the proposition below.
Proposition 1 The importer maintains an existing partnership as long as his belief
on his supplier is greater than or equal to a critical reputation level , where  2 [0; 1]
and  < 0. Otherwise he terminates the partnership.
Proof. See Appendix.
Although Proposition (1) is similar to a well-known result (see for example
Rothschild, 1974 and Whittle, 1982) the details of the proof appear in the Ap-
pendix.11 The key elements of the proof involve the use of standard recursive tech-
niques to show that V (:) is a unique, well-dened, continuous and increasing func-
tion. Abstracting from time indices, it can be readily veried that for any  > 0;
V () > V (0) > V (0)   s, and by the continuity and monotonicity of V (:), there
is a unique , such that V () = V (0)   s. Since V () is monotonically increasing
in , it follows that for all   , V ()  V (0)   s; so that the buyer will remain
in partnership with the current seller. Whereas for  < , V () < V (0)   s and
the buyer would prefer to initiate a partnership with a new seller. Note that even
when in partnership with a good seller, the buyer might switch to a new seller, this
is because even a good type could su¤er a run of such bad luck that it would drive
his reputation down below the critical level. Further note that  can be thought
of as a "barrier for reputation"if ever reputation falls below this level, the buyer
ceases trading with his current seller. From now on, I consider the situation where
the buyer is and remain in partnership with the same seller.
10If the buyer prior belief is close to zero then the posterior belief derived as above according to
Bayesrule would not be much di¤erent.
11The framework here is similar to a one-and-a-half-armed bandit. Both arms are risky, paying
positive prots and sometimes negative ones, with a probability that is di¤erent and that can be
learned through experience. But the arm with initial prior always pays the same value, V (0)  s;
as evaluated by the buyer before being tried.
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4 Reputation and trade
In this section I investigate the role of sellers reputation on the quantity decision
of the buyer within an existing buyer-seller partnership. At the beginning of each
period t, the buyer o¤ers a one-period contract to the seller he is in partnership with,
specifying a quantity q. The buyer holds a belief t 1 that his seller is good. The
shipment passes inspection with probability (1   G)t 1 + (1   B)(1   t 1), in
which case the buyer receives u(p; q): Regardless of the inspection realisation, the
buyer incurs a per unit inspection cost and the xed cost f for writing the contract.
The buyers chooses q to maximise his expected per-period prot:
max
q
E((p; q; c; f)jt 1) = [(1 G)t 1 + (1 B)(1  t 1)]u(p; q)  cq   f (5)
Let qt be the quantity imported by the buyer at time t, that maximizes E(jt 1)
given t 1. The optimal purchase volume is independent of the outcome of the
inspection in period t. The buyer optimal quantity decision depends only on the
belief he holds about the sellers type in t and updated beliefs a¤ect his decision in
the following period. Intuitively, following a success, an improved reputation would
lead the buyer to import higher volumes from his seller, while a failure resulting in
a deterioration of the reputation would lead to decreased quantity imported. This
intuition is formalised in the proposition below.
Proposition 2 Whenever a partnership is formed, the optimal quantity q the buyer
imports increases as he becomes more optimistic about his supplier. i.e. @q=@ > 0.
Proof. After a partnership is initiated, the buyer chooses q to maximise
E( (p; q; c; f)jt 1): Denoting the buyers optimal decision at time t by qt , the
rst-order necessary condition yields:
[(1 G)t 1 + (1 B)(1  t 1)]uq(p; qt )  c= 0 (6)
Condition (6) requires uq(p; q?) > 0: The second-order necessary condition requires
uqq(p; q
?) < 0. Diminishing marginal returns in quantity is both necessary and
su¢ cient for the existence of an interior solution.
The optimal quantity imported qt = q(t 1;
G;B; p;c), depends upon the buyers
prior t 1, the probability that the shipment imported is rejected for both types, and
the marginal cost of inspection. In particular it follows from condition (6) that:
@qt
@t 1
=   (
B  G)uq(p; qt )
[(1 G)t 1 + (1 B)(1  t 1)]uqq(p; qt )
> 0 (7)
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Thus, the optimal quantity imported increases as the belief that the supplier is of
the good type increases.
5 Food regulation, reputation and trade
I nowmove on to the main results of the paper. In this section I examine the impact of
an increase in the domestic regulation m on the optimal volume purchased within
a partnership. In order to allow for a role of reputation, I consider an existing
partnership at time t, that remained in existence over the following k periods, and
explore the changes in the optimal volume of import at time t+ k; given a change in
the regulation at time t. I uncover two channels through which regulation stringency
a¤ects international trade.
As shown in proposition (2), at time t+ k the optimal volume of import, qt+k =
q(t+k 1;G;B; p;c), depends both on the reputation of the supplier t+k 1; and his
typebecause good and bad quality suppliers have di¤erent probability of supplying
defective products:
A change in the stringency of the regulation m at time t a¤ects the optimal quantity
imported at time t+ k; both directly and indirectly.
@qt+k
@m
=
@G
@m
@qt+k
@G

t+k 1;B
+
@B
@m
@qt+k
@B

t+k 1;G| {z }
Direct e¤ect
+
@t+k 1
@m
@qt+k
@t+k 1

G;B| {z }
Indirect e¤ect
(8)
The direct e¤ect is a supply-side e¤ect and is termed the regulation e¤ect. The
indirect e¤ect is a demand-side e¤ect and is termed the reputation e¤ect. I now
examine each e¤ects in order to then derive the net e¤ect of a change in the stringency
of the regulation on optimal trade volumes.
5.1 Regulation e¤ect
From equation (8) the regulation e¤ect writes:
@qt+k
@m

t+k 1
=
@G
@m
@qt+k
@G

t+k 1;B
+
@B
@m
@qt+k
@B

t+k 1;G
(9)
A rise in the stringency of the regulation 'm at time t; a¤ects directly the optimal
volume of trade at time t+k, through the rate of shipment rejection j; j = fG;Bg.
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Proposition 3 Suppose at the beginning of period t, there is an increase in the
stringency of the standard m set in the buyers country. The direct e¤ect of this
increase is a decrease in the optimal volume of trade at time t+ k. That is,
@qt+k
@m
=
(m)uq(p; q

t+k)
[(1 G)t+k 1 + (1 B)(1  t+k 1)]uqq(p; qt+k)
< 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
A more stringent standard has a negative e¤ect on the optimal quantity imported
at time t+ k. Indeed, a stricter standard a¤ects the supply of quality goods at time
t + k, simply because it is more di¢ cult to pass inspection under a more stringent
standard. Note that the increase in the rejection rate due to a stricter standard,
does not depend either on the sellers type, @
G
@m
= @
B
@m
> 0,12 or whether the change
in regulation took place at t or t+ k.
Importantly, the magnitude of the regulation e¤ect decreases in t+k 1; that is the
belief the buyer holds when the change in regulation occurs at time t. It ranges in
[ C
(1 B) ;
C
(1 G) ]; with C =
(m)uq(p;q
?)
uqq(p;q?)
< 0: It is easily veried that when both types
of sellers have the same probability of rejection, i.e. G = B; there is no reputation
building and the negative e¤ect is constant equal to 2C. Additionally, the size of the
interval increases the further apart the rates of rejection for each type.
Equivalently, a seller on which the buyer is optimistic, whether accurate or not13,
is less strongly hit by a stricter regulation. Since a higher belief implies a larger
purchase volume, larger sellers are less a¤ected than smaller ones.
5.2 Reputation e¤ect
The second channel through which regulation may inuence the buyer optimal quan-
tity decision is through the belief he holds on the seller he is trading with. From
equation (8) the reputation e¤ect writes:
@qt+k
@m

G;B
=
@t+k 1
@m
@qt+k
@t+k 1

G;B
(10)
A change in the regulation at time t a¤ects the quantity decision of the buyer through
the sellers reputation at time t + k. The sellers reputation at t, is invariant to a
12Under this setting the quality distributions for both types are such that @
G
@m
= @
B
@m
; a change
in the regulation a¤ects the probability of rejection equally for both types. However, allowing for a
change in the regulation to a¤ect di¤erently good and bad type seller would lead to a similar result.
13Imagine a bad type that enjoyed a run of such good luck that it would drive his reputation up.
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change in the regulation at t, since reputation is a function of past events and not
current ones. That is, t 1 depends only on the sellers failure history up to t   1.
However, the rise in m a¤ects the sellers future reputation. An increase in the
stringency of the regulation facilitates the formation of reputations, the @t+k 1
@m
term.
This intuition is formalised in the proposition below.
Proposition 4 Conditional on the partnership being maintained over the following
k periods, at time t an increase in the stringency of the standard m leads to an
increase in the sellers reputation at time t+ k. That is @t+k 1=@m > 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
A rise in the stringency of the regulation m, increases the sellers future reputa-
tion relative to what it would have been had the regulation not changed. Provided
the seller remained in partnership, the e¤ect is positive whether he enjoyed a run of
successes or su¤ered a run of failures over the k periods.
Why is that? If a seller enjoyed a run of good luck his reputation at time t + k is
updated upwards. But it is updated further up than it would have been under a
constant regulation regime. Simply because under a stricter regulation, it is more
di¢ cult to successfully pass inspections. Therefore a success is more informative and
better rewarded. Now, if the seller su¤ered a run of bad luck, still his reputation in t+
k, will be higher. While a success is more informative, a failure is less informative and
less severely sanctioned. Under stricter regulation there is more merit in succeeding
but less demerit in failing.
From Propositions (2) and (4), the indirect e¤ect of a change in the regulation
through reputation is positive:
@qt+k
@m

G;B
=
@t+k 1
@m| {z }
>0
@qt+k
@t+k 1

G;B| {z }
>0
(11)
An increase in the stringency of the regulation facilitates the formation of reputations,
@t+k 1
@m
> 0. Additionally, the optimal quantity decision of the buyer varies positively
with the belief he holds at the beginning of period t+ k;
@qt+k
@t+k 1
> 0: Thus, a change
in the regulation at time t, has a positive impact on purchase volume at time t+ k;
thus moderating its direct negative e¤ect.
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Corollary 4.1 The reputation e¤ect is non-monotone. It varies with the suppliers
reputation at the time the regulation change takes place and its failure history over
the past k periods. It is increasing up to a unique value  2]0; 1[; and decreasing
thereafter. Moreover, the e¤ect is zero when  2 f0; 1g. Let
 =
1
1 + (1 
G
1 B )

(
G
B
)
 (12)
where  () is the number of successes (failures) following inspection over the past
k periods, and +  = k > 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
Considering realisations over the past k periods as given, if the buyer holds a
very low or very high belief about his sellers type, the magnitude of the reputation
e¤ect is close to zero. In fact, if there is a very low or very high belief that the seller
is good, then further trial with the same seller would not generate much valuable
information. According to Bayesrule if the buyer prior belief is close to zero or one
then the posterior belief derived would not be much di¤erent. The magnitude of the
e¤ect is maximum when the sellers reputation at time t equals :
In equation (12),  varies with the sellers failure history  and : When  = k,
the realisations over the k periods are only successes, the value for  shifts towards
zero. Inspection are more informative for low levels of reputation, since it is more
di¢ cult for suppliers with a low initial reputation to pass all inspections. While if
 = k; realisations are only failures,  shifts towards one. In this case, inspections
are more informative for high levels of reputation, since everything else being equal,
a supplier with good reputation is less likely to fail future inspections.
5.3 The net e¤ect
Overall, the net e¤ect of a more stringent standard at time t on optimal purchase
volumes at time t + k is the resultant of two diverging forces; a direct negative
supply-side e¤ect, and an indirect positive demand-side e¤ect.
@qt+k
@m
=
@qt+k
@m

t+k 1| {z }
< 0
Regulation e¤ect
+
@t+k 1
@m
@qt+k
@t+k 1

G;B| {z }
> 0
Reputation e¤ect
(13)
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An increase in the regulation at time t, decreases trade volumes within a partnership
at date t + k, below its original trend if @t+k 1
@'m
is di¤erent from zero.14 That is, it
shifts the original trend upwards (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Net E¤ect of a More Stringent Standard on Trade Volume.
The intuition goes as follows. Suppose a supplier started o¤ in time t, with a low
reputation, but successfully passed inspections in the following k periods. His repu-
tation at t+k is updated upwards. Still, the direct e¤ect of a change in the regulation
at time t is negative and signicant. However, the reputation e¤ect is large, given
he behaved well over the past k periods. It partly mitigates the negative regulation
e¤ect. The overall net impact on trade is as if the suppliers reputation was higher
than it actually is.
14The magnitude of the reputation e¤ect, @t+k@m ; is maximum when the suppliers reputation at
time t; equals , and null if it equals zero or one (corollary 4.1).
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The extent to which the reputation e¤ect attenuates the adverse direct e¤ect of a
more stringent regulation depends on the sellers reputation in t, and on how well the
seller behaved over the past k periods. That is, whether he proved to be a promising
supplier. Now, since the reputation e¤ect is non monotone in t (corollary 4.1), the
overall net e¤ect is itself non monotone in t.
 At the assymptotes, the net e¤ect equals the regulation e¤ect (point A and B
in Figure 1).
lim
t!0
@qt+k
@m
= lim
t!1
@qt+k
@m
=
@qt+k
@m

t+k 1
That is, at time t when the regulation changes, if the buyers belief is zero or
one, the net e¤ect of a stricter standard on the optimal volume of import at
time t + k narrows down to the direct e¤ect. Thus, for very low or very high
levels of the suppliers reputation, the direct negative e¤ect dominates.
 For intermediate levels of the suppliers reputation, the reputation e¤ect sig-
nicantly attenuates the direct negative e¤ect. The attenuation is maximum
for t = : The net e¤ect reaches a maximum for t 2]0; 1[ (point C in Figure
1).
Intuitively,  can be thought of as a breaking point, when inspection is the most
informative and crucial in determining whether the supplier falls in the good-type
rather than the bad-type category.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper I uncover two channels through which regulation stringency matters for
international trade: directly, a stricter standard a¤ects the supply of quality goods
and indirectly through reputation. I refer to the former e¤ect as the regulation e¤ect,
and to the latter as the reputation e¤ect. I show that in presence of heterogeneous
quality, reputation matters for trade. But more importantly, reputation has the
power to mitigate the direct negative e¤ect of a more stringent sanitary standard
on trade. Results arise from a framework reduced to its simplest form. I develop a
model of reputation-based transactions between a buyer in one country and a supplier
in another, where information on the quality of the good traded is incomplete but
symmetric.
The net e¤ect of a stricter regulation on trade volume varies non monotonically
with the belief the buyer holds about his seller at the time the change in regulation
17
takes place. This is so even without taking into account endogenous technologi-
cal upgrading in the suppliers country. For both very low and very high sellers
reputation, the reputation e¤ect is negligible vis-à-vis the regulation e¤ect. For in-
termediate levels of the suppliers reputation, the reputation e¤ect may signicantly
water down the direct negative e¤ect. Practically, good and bad type sellers can be
thought of as complying and noncomplying rms. The model implicitly recognizes
the coexistence of both types of rms, which is a situation often found in low-income
countries where a small modern export-oriented segment invests in meeting foreign
quality standards. An intermediate level of condence thus matches the situation
of low income countries. I can now answer the question raised in introduction. It
is indeed not necessarily true that enhanced stringency of food regulations has a
negative e¤ect on developing-country exports.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition (1). Let B[0; 1] represent the set of bounded, contin-
uous real-valued functions with domain [0; 1]. I begin by dening the operator
T : B[0; 1]! B[0; 1] as follows:
T (f(t 1)) = ((1 G)t 1 + (1 B)(1  t 1))
+[((1 G)t 1 + (1 B)(1  t 1))max ff(st); f(0)  sg
+(Gt 1 +B(1  t 1))max ff(ft ); f(0)  sg]
where st and 
f
t are as dened in equation (3) above. I then proceed as follows:
First, I prove that it is true that T takes bounded, continuous real-valued func-
tions with domain [0; 1] to bounded continuous real-valued functions with domain
[0; 1]. That is, T : B[0; 1]! B[0; 1].
Next I prove Blackwells two su¢ ciency conditions for a contraction, which ensure
that the contraction mapping theorem applies and that there exists a unique solution
to the recursive equation (4), this requires that:
(i) T satises monotonicity, that is for any f; h 2 B[0; 1] with f(x)  h(x) for all
x 2 [0; 1] then (Tf)(x)  (Th)(x) for all x 2 [0; 1]
(iI) and T satises discounting, that is there exists some constant  2 (0; 1) such
that, (Tf)(x) + a  (T (f + a))(x), for all constants a.
Finally I prove that S takes increasing functions to increasing functions. That T
preserves continuity and preserves the monotonically increasing property is su¢ cient
for ensuring that V (:) is continuous and increasing.
 T preserves continuity since the posterior belief distribution is a discrete prob-
ability distribution and the Bayesian updating rule is continuous on the prior.
 We now apply Blackwells su¢ cient conditions to show that T is a contraction.
Suppose that f(x)  h(x) for all x, then it follows that for all x,
max ff( (1 G)x
(1 G)x+(1 B)(1 x)); f(x0)  sg max fh(
(1 G)x
(1 G)x+(1 B)(1 x));h(x0)  sg
and
max ff( Gx
Gx+B(1 x)); f(x0)  sg max fh( 
Gx
Gx+B(1 x));h(x0)  sg:
It follows that (Tf)(x)(Th)(x): Thus, T is monotone.
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 We turn to the discounting condition:
(T (f + a))(x) = ((1 G)x+ (1 B)(1  x))u(p; q)  cq   f
+((1 G)x+ (1 B)(1  x))max ff( (1 G)x
(1 G)x+(1 B)(1 x)) + a; f(x0) + a  sg
+(Gx+B(1  x))max ff( Gx
Gx+B(1 x)) + a; f(x0) + a  sg
So,
(T (f + a))(x)  a+ ((1 G)x+ (1 B)(1  x))
+ ((1 G)x+ (1 B)(1  x))max ff( (1 G)x
(1 G)x+(1 B)(1 x)); f(x0)  sg
+ (Gx+B(1  x))max ff( Gx
Gx+B(1 x)); f(x0)  sg
or equivalently
(T (f + a))(x)  (T (f))(x) + a
which is precisely the discounting condition since 0 <  < 1. Therefore T satises
Blackwells su¢ cient conditions, and T is a contraction. By the contraction mapping
theorem, if T is a contraction, there is a unique xed point f ? 2 B such that
f ? = T (f ?) where f ? is exactly the value function V ().
 Finally, I show that T maps strictly increasing functions into strictly increasing
functions. Suppose that f is strictly increasing and that  > . Consider
(Tf)() (Tf)(): Then
(Tf)()  (Tf)() = (  )(B G)
+[(1 G)+ (1 B)(1  )][max ff(s); f(0)  sg max ff(s); f(0)  sg]
+ [G+B(1  )][maxff(f ); f(0)  sg  maxff(f ); f(0)  sg]
+ (  )(B  G)[max ff(s); f(0)  sg  max ff(f ); f(0)  sg]:
Since 0 = 0;  > ; 
s > s and f > f ; and since f is increasing
maxff(s); f(0)  sg  maxff(s); f(0)  sg
and
maxff(f ); f(0)  sg  maxff(f ); f(0)  sg:
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Furthermore s > f > f ; so
maxff(s); f(0)  sg  maxff(f ); f(0)  sg:
Hence,
(Tf)() (Tf)() > (  )(B  G) > 0:
Thus Tf is a strictly increasing function and V (:) is continuous and increasing. Thus,
for any t > 0 and given s > 0; V (t) > V (0) > V (0)   s. Therefore, there is a
unique value of  such that V () = V (0)  s; and  < 0:
Proof of Proposition (3). Di¤erentiating equation (6) w.r.t m yields:
 [@
G
@m
t 1 +
@B
@m
(1  t 1)]uq(p; qt ) < 0 (14)
From the quality distributions for each type, detailed in section (2), observe that
@G
@m
= @
B
@m
: That is, a change in the regulation m; a¤ects both types equally. Let
(m) =
@G
@m
= @
B
@m
: It follows from condition (14) that:
@qt
@m
=
(m)uq(p; q

t )
[(1 G)t 1 + (1 B)(1  t 1)]uqq(p; qt )
< 0
In an established partnership, the immediate e¤ect of a rise in the stringency of the
regulation is a decrease in the optimal volume of import.
Proof of Proposition (4). Consider the sellers reputation at the beginning of
period t+ k: Expressed in terms of t and hk 1, gives:
t+k 1(hk 1; t) =
(1 G)(G)t
(1 G)Gt + (1 B)B(1  t) (15)
where  () is the number of successes (failures) following inspection over the past
k periods, and +  = k   1 > 0:
Di¤erentiating equation (15) w.r.t m yields:
@t+k 1
@m
= t(1  t)(m) (
B G)[(1 G)(1 B)+GB ][(1 G)(1 B)] 1(GB) 1
[(1 G)(G)t+(1 B)(B)(1 t)]2
(16)
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where (m) =
@G
@m
= @
B
@m
: Note that the reputation t is not a¤ected by a change
in regulation at date t. Given G;B 2 [0; 1], and (m) > 0, all terms in expression
(16) are positive. Thus,
@t+k 1
@'m
 0 (17)
An increase in the stringency of regulation at time t; leads to an increase in the
sellers reputation at time t + k; conditional on the partnership being maintained
over the past k periods.
Proof of Corollary (4.1). Let f : [0; 1]! [0; 1] be equal to
f(t; t+k 1) =
@t+k 1
@m
 @q

t+k
@t+k 1
Replacing using equation (7) and (16) yields:
f(t; t+k 1) = t(1  t)
 (m)(B G)[(1 G)(1 B)+GB ][(1 G)(1 B)] 1(GB) 1
[(1 G)(G)t+(1 B)(B)(1 t)]2 (18)
   (B G)uq(p;qt+k)
[(1 G)t+k 1+(1 B)(1 t+k 1)]uqq(p;qt+k)
(19)
Equation (19) rewrites:
f(t) = C
t(1 t)
[At +B(1  t)]2
where
8>>><>>>:
C =  (B  G)uq(p; qt+k)
 [(m)(B G)((1 G)(1 B)+GB)((1 G)(1 B)) 1(GB) 1]
[(1 G)t+k 1+(1 B)(1 t+k 1)]uqq(p;qt+k)
A = (1 G)(G)
B = (1 B)(B)
At the end of any period t, if the buyer knows with certainty the type of his seller,
and t 2 f0; 1g, the impact of an increase in m at time t on future reputation is null,
there is no more update and f(0) = f(1) = 0: As the buyer becomes more optimistic
and t approaches one (or more pessimistic and t approaches zero), inspections
become less informative. In which cases, there is no room for a reputation building.
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Now for any t 2]0; 1[, f(t) > 0: By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there exists
a  2]0; 1[ such that f 0() = 0: That is f(:) reaches a maximum in . It is a matter
of algebra, to obtain:
 =
1
1 + (1 G
1 B )

( G
B
)

and 0 <  < 1; for any G;B 2 [0; 1] and ;  2 N+:
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